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4.1  Introduction 
As the process leading to a new round of  international trade nego- 
tiations in the framework of  the General Agreement  on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) begins, it is clear that agricultural trade will be one of 
the most crucial areas of negotiation and confrontation. The most prom- 
inent participants in this area are the United States and the countries 
of  the European Community (EC). Much of  the success of the new 
round will depend on how these two entities resolve their agricultural 
trade relations and, in particular, their problems vis-a-vis grain trade. 
While much has been written about the impact of EC domestic and 
international agricultural policies on international trade, not nearly as 
much has been written about possible U.S. responses and the inter- 
actions between U.S. and EC policies. The purpose of this paper is to 
examine the agricultural trade rivalry between the United States and 
the EC mainly from a conceptual viewpoint. The objective is to uncover 
viable U.S. policy responses to EC agricultural policies and to discuss 
whether EC policies are always detrimental to the U.S., as is commonly 
believed. Empirical estimates will be used to illuminate the arguments. 
Every government in the world interferes in its agricultural sector. 
It seems that this is a necessity arising out of different political and 
economic objectives and realities at different stages of  each country’s 
development. Thus in the early stages of development, governments 
tend to tax the agricultural sector because it offers the largest (if not 
the only) opportunity for generating savings for growth. At later stages 
of development, as the agricultural  sector shrinks relative to the in- 
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dustrial and tertiary sectors, taxation not only declines but turns into 
subsidization; the intersectoral adjustments are usually not fast enough 
to offset production increases caused by  technological advances. Ex- 
cess supplies in the face of inelastic demands often lead to sharp secular 
declines in terms of trade for agricultural products. The almost inevi- 
table response  by governments faced with  such problems  has  been 
support for agricultural producers, usually price guarantees. The sup- 
ports in  turn lead to excess resources being drawn into agriculture, 
faster technological development, and faster attendant production in- 
creases. Unless larger external markets are found, larger subsidies are 
needed, and this process feeds on itself as it generates powerful lobbies 
for keeping the support policies intact. 
This, in very general terms, is the historical pattern behind the cur- 
rent EC-U.S. agricultural trade confrontation. Both entities have ag- 
ricultural support policies with very long historical roots (Butler 1983; 
Petit 1985). When these policies were put in force, in the 1930s for the 
United States and the post-World  War I1 period for the EC countries, 
trade in agricultural products was a small part of the countries’ trade. 
Consequently, the external aspects of these policies were not of fore- 
most concern, and trade policies were viewed as a necessary appendage 
to policies directed mainly at domestic producers. It is largely for this 
reason that liberalizing trade in agricultural products was strongly re- 
sisted by the U.S. in the early days of GATT. In fact, in 1955 the United 
States sought and obtained a formal “waiver”  from its obligation to 
apply GATT rules to primary products. 
In the early days of  the EC’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 
the U.S. tried in the Kennedy Round to limit the CAP to farmer-income 
supports rather than trade controls. Although the EC exhibited a will- 
ingness to negotiate by offering to freeze the level of protection, the 
U.S. did not accept, and agreement was not reached. Subsequent ne- 
gotiations in the International Wheat  Council (IWC) and the Tokyo 
Round produced little more than a vague statement to the effect that 
no country was to grant any export subsidies on primary products in 
a manner that would give it  “more than an equitable share of world 
export trade.” 
International trade in agricultural products tends to be dominated by 
grains. Hence, the world grain situation and policies figure prominently 
in international discussions. During the last 20 years, the world grain 
situation has changed from a period  of abundance in  the  1960s and 
early 1970s to a period of shortage in the mid- and late 1970s and back 
to a surplus currently.  While  U.S. agriculture has borne the largest 
cost of adjustment in the periods of surplus, it also gained the most by 
far in the period of  shortage. It is probably not unreasonable to state 
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was  due to the overinvestment  in agriculture arising out of  excess 
profits in the mid-1970s. Of  course, it is politically expedient for the 
U.S. to blame its economic problems in agriculture on another country, 
but the EC policies have been in place with the same form throughout 
this whole period. Not surprisingly, it is only in periods of world surplus 
and sagging prices that the EC becomes the obvious scapegoat and the 
tone of the rhetoric rises. While these points have been made repeatedly 
by  EC officials (Green Europe 1985a), they do not move the current 
U.S. administration, which is particularly sensitive to rises in public 
spending and less eager than  previous administrations to undertake 
costly farm programs. 
This paper first reviews the discussion of agricultural protection in 
the U.S. and EC, and the impacts of their policies on world trade and 
prices. Then a simple model designed to capture the essence of the 
U.S. and  EC grains policies is used  to explore the effects of  those 
policies on the two trading  rivals (section 4.4).  In section 4.5 three 
possible U.S.  reactions to the EC policies-optimal export taxes, buffer 
stocks, and export subsidies-are  explored. Section 4.6  presents some 
empirical estimates of the potential effects of the various policies. The 
final section summarizes the main conclusions. 
4.2  Protection and the Impact of EC and U.S. Policies on 
International Trade 
One of the main differences between EC and U.S. agricultural pol- 
icies is their relative transparency. The EC’s objective in  the formu- 
lation of  the CAP is not only farmer income but also price stability. 
The main instruments are variable import levies and export subsidies 
that achieve both objectives simultaneously. While direct income sup- 
port to the farmers would lead to smaller welfare losses, the huge direct 
transfer to producers would then be both visible and beyond the limits 
of  the EC budget.  In theory, the higher real incomes of  consumers 
could be taxed to provide for the transfer, but the institutional structure 
of. EC revenues prohibits  direct income taxes on consumers. Under 
the current policy, the budget cost to the Community largely covers 
the quantities traded and stored, and the EC consumers foot the largest 
share of the total transfer invisibly by means of higher prices. 
U.S.  farm policy, on the other hand, has not used direct trade and 
price controls such as export subsidies. It has relied mostly on supply 
management and storage operations, in addition to the loan rate scheme 
(which is essentially a guaranteed price floor), extensive subsidization 
of research, and extension programs. Despite U.S. claims not to have 
used direct export subsidies, the massive food aid program instituted 
via PL 480 in the 1960s can be viewed as nothing more than an indirect 104  Alexander H. Sarris 
export subsidy. While U.S. law provides that PL 480 shipments are 
not supposed to replace commercial flows, research (Abbott 1979) has 
shown that food aid was largely substituted for commercial imports by 
developing countries and thus contributed to displacing other exporters. 
What protection is afforded the agricultural sectors in the U.S.  and 
EC? With the multitude of farm support mechanisms (and they differ 
from country to country), protection in the traditional sense is difficult 
to measure.  Furthermore, primary  agricultural production is charac- 
terized by unpredictable yields because of  environmental factors and 
large price fluctuations. Hence, the measurement of protection should 
not involve simply the comparison of prices with and without the var- 
ious policy instruments, but rather the comparison of price distributions 
with and without the policies. However, this implies that not only price 
levels but also the higher moments of the price distributions should be 
computed, and this has not been done to any extent yet. While some 
initial attempts to measure protection empirically under uncertainty 
have been reported in the literature (Eldor 1984), all researchers have 
been computing traditional measures of nominal and effective protec- 
tion. For instance, Sampson and Yeats (1977) report effective protec- 
tion coefficients for the EC between 83 percent (corn) and 1,323 percent 
(butter) for the year 1974. 
Given the instability of world prices, it is clear that traditional mea- 
sures of protection will yield numbers that fluctuate from year to year. 
This is most obvious in  the series for producer-subsidy equivalents 
published  by  the Food  and Agricultural  Organization  of  the United 
Nations (FA0 1975, 1983, 1985). That series is supposed to measure 
the proportion of  total farmer receipts for one product that are due 
directly or indirectly to government policies (both internal and exter- 
nal). Table 4.1 clearly shows that, depending on the product and the 
year, both EC and U.S. policies have been influencing farmer incomes 
significantly. There are large fluctuations in these numbers, depending 
on the year of calculation. 
The numbers in table 4.1 do not indicate the degree of  protection. 
They simply show how policies in place affect farm incomes. Since 
they are derived by dividing total policy-induced excess farm receipts 
by total realized farm sales, they also depend on the level of production, 
which is largely stochastic. 
What is the impact of EC agricultural policies on international trade? 
Several studies have attempted to measure the impact on world prices 
and trade  flows of  removing  the EC export subsidies and  variable 
levies. Almost all of them employ a nonstochastic partial-equilibrium 
framework, and they look at trade liberalization as the removal of a 
tariff the average size of which is computed by reference to the average 
levies over a period. In other words, the framework is standard partial- 105  EC-US Agricultural Trade Confrontation 
Table 4.1  Producer-Subsidy Equivalents for the EC and U.S. (percent) 
Wheat  Maize  Rice 
Milk 
Product  sa 
Sugar 
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-9.0  0.1 
23.1  0.5 
59.2  2.5 
63.7  26.4 
68.5  15.5 
50.4  1.2 
41.8  3.3 
46.4  7.7 
58.5  7.8 
44.9  38.0 
37.6  17.2 
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EC  U.S. 
79.2  8.5 
78.3  21.3 
92.5  32.9 
80.4  30.8 
77.2  25.6 
23.9  20.8 
18.8  8.9 
16.9  2.7 
22.0  17.7 
23.1  21.2 
16.1  -1.6 
Source: For years 1974175 to 1978179. see FA0 (1983); for the rest, FA0 (1985). 
"From  1979180 and later, the producer-subsidy equivalent is  only for milk  and not all 
milk products. 
equilibrium trade liberalization (for instance, Valdes and Zietz 1980). 
The results depend on the average levy that is assumed as well as on 
the supply and demand elasticities. 
Sampson and Snape (1980) find that the abolition of the EC variable 
levies and export subsidies would lead to a rise in world wheat prices 
of  3.3 to  11 percent, depending on the elasticities assumed, a rise in 
world barley  prices  of  3.4 to 11 percent, and a rise in  world maize 
(corn) prices of 2 to 11 percent. For the same products, Koester (1982) 
finds that world prices would increase by 9.6 percent for wheat, 14.3 
percent for barley, and  2.2  percent for maize.  Sarris and  Freebairn 
(1983) find that EC liberalization in the wheat market would raise av- 
erage world prices of wheat by  11 percent, while de Gorter and Meilke 
(1985) find only a 1.8 percent net increase in world wheat prices when 
EC intervention is removed. 
While these studies differ in  the magnitude of  the effects from EC 
liberalization, they are uniform in their prediction of  an overall rise in 
average world prices. A rise in prices of products exported by the U.S. 
would clearly benefit the U.S. In fact, Koester (1982, 30) points out 
that liberalized EC grain trade would boost U.S. net export revenues 
by $2.3 billion and would iqrease net U.S. welfare by $6.1 1 million. 
Little attention has been given to the fact that by stabilizing domestic 
markets, EC farm policies tend to destabilize external markets. How- 
ever, Sarris and Freebairn (1983) have shown empirically that the re- 
moval of  EC wheat policies would lead to a decline in the standard 
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There has been even less examination of the impact of removal of 
U.S.  agricultural policy on world trade and prices.  Table 4.1 shows 
that U.S. policies also have a significant impact on farmer income and 
consequently on production and trade. 
While much has been written about the EC protective policies in 
agriculture, it is not as widely known that the EC producers are equally 
and often more efficient than their U.S. counterparts in agriculture. A 
recent detailed study by  Stanton (1986) reviewed  a large number of 
micro cost-survey studies in the EC and compared costs of production 
for various cereal grains in the EC and the United  States. Table 4.2 
displays some of the interesting results of this study. It shows that EC 
cereal producers are quite competitive with their U.S. rivals. The French 
and English produce wheat more cheaply than does the U.S.,  while 
the Italians on average are more expensive. In the coarse grains cat- 
egory, the U.S. producers seem to have the edge. But these conclusions 
depend significantly on the foreign exchange rates assumed, and these 
comparisons are based on rather well-organized, efficient farmers. Of 
course, protection would help many of the marginal farmers stay in 
business, but as is quite evident in both the United States and the EC, 
reducing the total number of farmers will not necessarily lessen the 
resources, such as land, used in agriculture. In fact, as small inefficient 
farms are taken over by larger better-organized ones, the sector’s ef- 
ficiency increases, and the amount of total production may increase 
by more than if  small farms are kept in business. In the EC, in fact, 
real farm-product prices  (which include the cost of protection) have 
fallen steadily since 1970 by about  15 percent (Sheehy 1984), but ag- 
ricultural production has increased rapidly. If protection slows the rate 
of  structural transformation of  EC agriculture toward more efficient 
production, it might not be detrimental to the United States, although 
it would still be quite harmful for the EC itself. 
Both EC and U.S.  policies have long historical roots that cannot be 
removed  easily. The pressure  to change a particular  policy  usually 
comes from internal conflicts. In the case of the CAP, the conflict has 
already appeared in the form of budgetary pressures. Hence, the EC 
is already examining ways to amend the CAP (see, for example, the 
Green Paper of the Commission [Green Europe 1985b1). The key ques- 
tion that concerns us here, however, is how the U.S. can react to the 
current EC policies and whether, through meaningful reaction, it can 
even derive benefits from the EC policies. 
4.3  An Analytical Model of EC-US Agricultural Trade in Grains 
The United States and EC both produce and trade a wide variety of 
agricultural products. Grains have been the source of the greatest con- 
flict, so we refer to them in our simple trade model. 107  EC-US Agricultural Trade Confrontation 
Table 4.2  Comparison of Production Costs for Wheat, Maize, and Barley in 
the U.S. and the European Community, 1982-1984  (In US$ per 
bushel) 
1982  1983  1984 




























































































































































































Source: Stanton (1986). 
a Column A figures use 1982 exchange rates; column B figures use 1984 exchange rates. 
CVE - Cash Variable Expenses. 
TCEL - Total Costs Excluding Land. 
TCIL - Total Costs Including Land. 
Consider three trading countries: the U.S., the EC, and the rest of 
the world. In the following, subscript  1 will denote the U.S., and sub- 
script 2, the EC. Production and consumption in the first two countries 
are given by the following linear stochastic supply and demand curves: 
(1)  S;t(pir) =  -a;  + kip; + bi(pit -  p;) - zit,  i =  12 
(2) 
where a;, ki, bi, ci, fi, dj  > 0 are constants, pit  is the domestic price in 
country i in period t,  and zit,  wit are random supply and demand shocks, 
Dit(  pir)  = ci -  lipi - di(pi, -  pi) + wit,  i = 1,2 108  Alexander H. Sarris 
uncorrelated over time and among themselves, with mean zero. In (1) 
and (2), pi  is the expected value ofp,,, or  the underlying long-run internal 
price, which for simplicity is assumed not to be a function of time. If 
ki = bi and li = di,  then (1)  and (2) collapse into the standard supply- 
demand framework.  However, the above formulation allows for dif- 
ferences between the short-run supply and demand responses to price 
(represented by the parameters bi and di) and the long-run responses 
(represented by the parameters kj  and 1;). 
It is assumed in (1) and (2) that producer and consumer prices are 
equal within each country. Although this is not strictly true, it is a fair 
approximation for both  the U.S.  and the EC settings which employ 
agricultural policies that largely manipulate the whole market rather 
than only the producers or consumers. Furthermore,  private  stock- 
holding behavior is already included in the demand curve. This is rea- 
sonable since the end-of-season demand for speculative stocks is a 
negative function of the difference between current and future expected 
prices. If  future expected prices are set equal to pi,  it can be readily 
seen that an adjustment to the parameter  dj  is all that is needed to 
include speculative stock behavior in a linear fashion. 
The excess supply functions of the two countries modeled above are 




ES;, (pi,) =  -ej + mipi + f;(pit -  pi) - vir,  i =  1,2 
ej = ai + ci 
x. = bi + di 
mi = kj + 1; 
vi, = zi,  + wit 
The random variable vi, is assumed to have variance equal to a’. 
function 
The rest of the world will be represented only by an excess demand 
(4)  WD,  (P,) = g -  np - h (P,  -  P) + u,, 
where g,  n,  h > 0, pt  is the world price in period t, p  is the underlying 
expected or trend value of p,, and u, is a zero mean correlated over 
time and with vir  (i =  1, 2) random variable, with variance equal to u2. 
Implicit in (4) is the view that the rest of the world retains fixed policies. 
This is  appropriate  since we are only interested here in the US-EC 
conflict. 
World equilibrium in period t is found by setting the sum of the two 
countries’ excess supplies equal to world excess demand: 109  EC-US Agricultural Trade Confrontation 
Agricultural policies in the two countries influence both the average 
value of domestic prices and the allowed deviation of domestic prices 
from their average values. These effects are modeled here as follows: 
Pi  = aiP 
p. -  p.  = P.(  1  PI  -  PI 
where a;,  Pi (i = 1,2) are positive parameters that are meant to sum- 
marize the net effects of  domestic policies. 
If  ai  = pi =  1  for some i, it is evident that the relevant country is 
behaving as if  it is pursuing free trade. 
By inserting (6) and (7) in expression (3) and subsequently in (3,  we 
can  solve  for the  free-trade  price  which  is  given  by  the  following 
expression: 
(8)  Pr  = P  + Pr7 
where p  is  the expected value  of  pr,  while pr = pr -  p.  These two 




= n  + aI  m, + a2  m2 
4 +  "If  + V2r 
h + Plfl + P2h' 
Pr = 
The price resulting when both the United States and the EC pursue 
free trade can be found simply by setting a,  = a2 = PI = p2 = 1 in 
(9) and (10). 
(1 1) 
where 
Pfl = Pf + Pfl 
g  + el + e2 - n  +  01,  m, + a2m2  P 
A (a,,  a21 
P= 
-  (12) 
and 
pf=  n  + m, + m2  n  + m, + m2 
In (12) and (13), the last two expressions just define the factors A and 
B by which the mean value and the standard deviation of the observed 
world  price  exceed their respective free-trade figures. If  ai 2 1 and 
pi 5  1  (i = 1,2), indicating a tendency of  internal policies to support 
on average  as well  as stabilize domestic prices,  then clearly  A I  1 110  Alexander H. Sarris 
while B L 1, indicating that world prices are depressed on average, as 
well as destabilized from their free-trade values. 
The above arguments and expressions were derived assuming fixed 
exchange rates. However, the recent wide swings in the value of the 
dollar have deep implications for the world markets, quite apart from 
policy interventions.  Assume that  U.S. and rest-of-world  prices  are 
expressed in U.S. dollars, while EC prices are expressed in EC cur- 
rency (assumed to be unique for ease of exposition). Let E represent 
the EC foreign-exchange rate in terms of units of EC currency per U.S. 
dollar. Inserting Ep, and Ep instead of pt and p,  respectively, in the 
expression for the excess supply of country 2, and assuming free trade 
for simplicity, we obtain the following expressions for the new free- 
trade price pffr: 
where 
g  + el  + e2 
n  + m, + Em2' 
Comparing these expressions with the ones in (12) and (13), it can be 
seen that a U.S. dollar appreciation (depreciation), which means an 
increase (decrease) in E, implies a lower (higher) average world price 
(in U.S. $) and smaller (higher) world price fluctuations. 
The foreign-exchange markets are heavily influenced by general mac- 
ro policies.  Schuh (1974) was among the first to point out that tight 
U.S. monetary policies negatively affect the agricultural export market 
for U.S. products. Chambers and Just (1981) calculated that the short- 
run impact on U.S. wheat prices of a dollar appreciation of 10 percent 
was -  12.4 percent while the long-run impact was  -7.9  percent. For 
corn prices the short- and long-run impact was -  1.9 percent and -  13.8 
percent, respectively, and for soybean prices, -  26.4 percent and -  21.7 
percent, respectively. Clearly, the effects of such large price changes 
are dramatic, but since they are not due to agricultural policies,  we 
shall ignore them in the sequel by setting E  = 1. 
Welfare in  both countries  is affected  by  the policies of the other. 
Comparing the distorted situation with one with free trade, producers 
in country  i  gain in period  t  a producer surplus (negative, if  a loss) 
equal to 
(16)  G Pir  =  '42  (Pi -  P~I  [Si  (P;) + Si  (P~)I  + {Yz (Pit -  Pi) 
*  [Sit (Pit) + Sit  (pi)] - '42  (Pfr -  ~f)  [Sir (PB) + Sit(~f)ll* 111  EC-US Agricultural Trade Confrontation 
In (16), the first term represents the trapezoidal area above the long- 
run supply curve between the distorted and free-trade average prices 
(Si (pi)  is only the long-run portion of the supply curve (l), that is, 
-ai + kipi),  while the second term inside the brackets represents the 
difference between the distorted and undistorted gains from short-run 
fluctuations. In figure 4.1,  GP, is  I epresented as the following sum of 
areas: 
(17)  GP,=AEGB+ BGHD-AEFC. 
In a similar vein, the gain in consumer surplus in country one com- 
pared to free trade is equal to 
(18)  G Cit  =  %(~f  -  Pi)[Di  (P~I  +  Di (pi)] + {%  (Pi -  Pit) . [Dit  (Pi) 
+ Dit (pit)] - %(~f  -  Pft) [Dit (Pt) + Dir  (~ft>l>. 
To  maintain the price differential between the domestic and inter- 
national markets, the government must intervene by, in essence, main- 
Q 
Fig. 4.1  Gain in producer surplus from domestic price distortion. 112  Alexander H. Sarris 
taining at the border a tariff or tax and claiming the proceeds. It is 
assumed at this point that no government stockholding is taking place, 
hence, all extra domestic supplies are disposed of in world markets. 
The treasury’s gain from such operations is equal to 
(19)  G G;t = (P, -  P;t)ES;t(P;t). 
The total welfare in country i in period  1, if producers, consumers, 
and the treasury are counted equally, is given by the sum of the three 
expressions in (16), (18), and (19): 
(20)  G;t = G P;,  + G Cjf  + G Gjt. 
Substituting (1)-(4),  (6), and (7), in (16), (18), and (19),  and taking 
the expected value of (20),  we arrive after some manipulations at the 
following expression for average total welfare gain of country  i com- 
pared to free trade [E (.) denotes expected value]: 
Gj = E (GJ = G Pi + G Cj + G Gi  (21) 
where 
= G L; (ai, a2) + G S; (Pi,P2), 
and 
where A and B were defined in (12) and (13). In (21), GL,(al,u2)  rep- 
resents the average welfare gain arising out of induced changes in long- 
run supply and demand patterns, while GSi(PI,PZ)  represents the av- 
erage welfare gain arising out of changes in the short-run fluctuations. 
It is quite clear that GL,( 1,l) = GSi(  1,l) = 0, as it should be. We  thus 
see that  there  are two independent effects of  the policies,  one that 
influences the long-run trends and the other that changes the probability 
distributions of domestic and external prices. 
4.4  The Impact of U.S. and EC Policies on Each Other 
We  shall first consider  the impact  of  average  protection  policies. 
Consider the expression for GLi in (22). If A < I, it can be shown that 
the term multiplying mipf in the brackets is greater than one, if  ai is 113  EC-US Agricultural Trade Confrontation 
sufficiently large; otherwise, it  is  smaller than one.  For the United 
States, -el + mlpf > 0, because the United States is a net exporter 
of grains.  If  the term multiplying the mlpf  is not too small, the term 
inside the brackets will still be positive, and since A < 1, GLI  < 0. In 
other words, the United States will lose on average from EC protection 
(assuming a2 > a1  2 1). The EC, however, does not necessarily lose. 
If  under free trade the EC is a net importer, that is,  -e2+m2pf < 0, 
it is quite possible that the expression in the brackets is negative and 
then GL2 > 0. These results are not surprising, as in this model both 
the U.S. and the EC are treated as large countries and hence, according 
to standard theory, are expected to be able to gain or lose from pro- 
tection, according to whether under free trade they are net importers 
or exporters, but  the precise  figures will  depend  on the parameter 
values. 
Turning now to the expressions GS,, it can be noticed first that, if 
0 I  P2 I  PI I  1, as is the case between the United States and the EC, 
then B > 1. However, the expression in  PI, p2 inside the brackets, 
which, incidentally, is identical to the expression in aI,  a2  inside the 
brackets of (22), does not always have a definite sign. The sign of GS, 
therefore, depends on PI,  P2,  as well as on the magnitude of the relative 
slope of the excess supply curve of country i vis-a-vis the world, and 
the magnitude of  its excess supply fluctuations compared to those of 
the world. It is thus possible that GS,20. In cereal trade, the EC in 
effect largely stabilizes internal grain prices, while in the United States 
the domestic price fluctuations are similar to the world ones. In terms 
of  this model, PI = 1, P2 = 0. For P2 = 0 and PI = 1, it can be seen 
from (23) that GS2 < 0,  while the sign of GS, depends on the sign of 
the expression 
and could be positive or negative. It is thus possible that the U.S. could 
benefit ceteris paribus from the  EC’s internal stabilization  of cereal 
markets. 
How do changes in  the protective  structure of the internal cereal 
markets affect the two trade partners? Consider the derivative of GLI 
with respect to a2. 
where p, = aI  A pf = a,  p. 
From the definition of A in (12), it is clear that dAlda, < 0 and dA/ 
da2 < 0. Also,  -e, + ml  pI  is the average U.S. excess supply of  the 114  Alexander H. Sarris 
product under consideration, in the distorted market. For all grains, 
this is positive.  If  aI  is close to one (denoting  small average U.S. 
protection, which is the case for grains), the bracket  in  (25) is also 
positive. Hence, aGLlIaa2  < 0, meaning that an increase in  average 
EC protection will, on average, hurt the United States. The other way 
around, however, is not as clear cut. Considering the change in GL2 
with respect to aI,  we have 
The expression a2  (2 - a2)  is always smaller than one. If  the EC is 
close  to  being  an  average  net  importer  at  price  p, that  is,  if 
-e + rn2 p < 0, then afortiori the whole bracket in (26) is negative, 
and hence, aGL21aa, > 0. The EC is an average net importer in  feed 
grains, and even in wheat it probably would be a net importer if  the 
average internal price was equal to the average world one. This means 
that an increase in average protection for the American grain farmers 
would benefit overall, rather than hurt, the EC. An increase in average 
American protection would also not benefit the U.S., as can be seen 
by considering the derivative of  GL, with respect to a,. After some 
manipulation, it can be shown that 
dGL , 
aa,  aa2  3a2  + m,  p2  (1 - a,)  5 -  . 
dGL,  dGLl  - 
The last inequality  follows from  the assumption that aI  z-  1. Since 
dGLl/aa2  < 0, it is clear that dGLl/acul < 0 as well. 
Nothing definite can be said about aGL2/da2.  Also, nothing definite 
can be said about the derivatives of GS,  with respect to PI  and P2. 
4.5 
What are the alternatives for the United States in response to the 
policy instituted by the EC? In this section we investigate some options 
under the simplifying assumption that the long-run and short-run supply 
and demand price elasticities for the U.S. are equal. This simplifies the 
analytical expressions in order to focus on the ideas. The assumption 
implies rn, = f,  in the model posed earlier. 
Since the United States, being a large trader, has monopoly power 
and is an exporter, economic theory suggests that an optimal export 
tax  in  every period  will  maximize welfare for the U.S.  (country  l), 
given the policy of the EC (country 2). 
Given the country 2 policy, country  1 will face an excess demand 
for its exports equal to 
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(28)  EDI, = g‘  - h’  pt + E, , 
where 
(29)  g’  = g  + e2 - (n + a2  m2  - h - P2f2)p, 
(30)  h‘  = h  + P2f2  9 
(31)  E,  = u, + v2,  7 
and p  is, as before, the average world price in the distorted market, 
The optimal  export tax of country  1 in  period  t can be found by 
equating the marginal curve of (28) with the excess supply of country 
1, which is now equal to 
(33) 
Assuming that no other policy besides an export tax is pursued by 
country 1, the domestic U.S. price and the world price in period t are 
given by the following expressions: 
ESI,  = - el  + fl  Pr  - VIP 
(34) 
g‘ + 2el  E, + 2vl,  + 
2fl  + h’  2fl  + h‘  PI, = 
and 
g’  (fl  + h’) + el  h’ 
h’  (2f1 + h‘) 
E,  (fl  + h’) + vlrh  ’ 
h’  (2f1 + h’)  +  (35)  Pr  = 
Notice that since the average value of pr is implicit in the nonsto- 
chastic part of (35) (because of (29)), it can be found by  solving the 
equation, 
g’ (fl  + h’) + el h‘ 
h’  (2f,  + h’)  ’  P= 
and is given by the following expression: 
(37)  pl  =  (fl  + Wg  + e2) +  h’  el 
(fl  + h‘)(n  + a2  m2)  + h’fl’ 
Under the assumption that the United States is an exporter under 
no tax, it can easily be shown, as expected, that p’ in (37) is higher 
than the average world price without the export tax as given in (32). 
The price p’ in (37) will now be the one dictating the value of g’ in 
(29), instead of p  in (32). 
The welfare that will be gained by country 1 (the sum of producer, 
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period, compared to a situation of no export tax, has been computed 
by Sarris (1982). Its expected value is equal to the following expression: 
where u,Z  = u2 + u$ 
In (381, the expression (f,  g’ - el  h’)/ (fl  + h’) is equal to the av- 
erage country  1 exports after the export tax, and in this context, it is 
naturally assumed to be positive. 
The expression WIE  is positive and additional to GI  found in (21). In 
other words, U.S. welfare can be raised  on average by  applying an 
optimal export tax in every period. However, it can readily be shown 
that dWIE/da2  < 0.  In other words, the maximum average gain that 
country 1 can have by applying a variable optimal export tax will decline 
as the support level in country 2 is raised. 
The effect of a U.S. variable export tax on the EC would probably 
be positive for commodities for which the EC is a net exporter, such 
as wheat, while it would be negative for commodities for which it is a 
net importer, such as coarse grains. This is based on the results of the 
previous section which showed that the derivative of GL2  with respect 
to at  is most probably positive if country 2 is an importer and negative 
if it is an exporter. An export tax in the United States will lower internal 
U.S. prices, implying aI  < 1, and hence would benefit (hurt) the EC 
in products that on average the EC exports (imports). However, an 
export tax by the United States is probably politically untenable, since 
it penalizes farmers. 
A much more viable policy, and one that directly benefits farmers 
when they need it most, is one of public or publicly supported stock- 
holding. Suppose that in period  r, the public induces, by some means, 
carryover stocks larger than normal ones by an amount I,. Since I, is 
defined as the difference between actual and normal stocks, its value 
can be positive or negative. Suppose for simplicity that the annual cost 
of the extra storage is quadratic and equal to yZ:.  By this definition, a 
negative deviation is also penalized, since it implies smaller-than-normal 
carryover stocks and hence, a loss of convenience yield. If at the end 
of period  r  an amount Z, has been accumulated, world price is raised 
above the no-interference level p,  to the level p:,  where 
Notice that if the average value of  I, is zero, the average world price 
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There is a welfare gain to producers of  country  1  and a loss to its 
consumers. However, a storage cost is incurred, as well as the cost of 
purchasing the stock (gain, if  sold). If we denote by LI,  (ZJ the total 
amount of welfare gain in year  t  by  country  1  (the sum of  producer 
and consumer gains as well as gains from storage operations), and we 
solve the stochastic control problem, 
we can find by stochastic dynamic programming the optimal steady- 
state solution for T -+ m.  This is given by the following expression (for 




- 2x V;, + WE,  z:,  =  +  I:,-  I’ 
2(x+y-n)  x+y-n 
X 
fl  + 2h’ 
2 (f,  + h’)2 ’ 
x= 
h’  w=  - 




7F = Y2  (y - vy2 + 4x y) < 0. 









= 4(x + y - n)’ 
The most significant aspects of these expressions are the following: 
First, it can be seen that country  1 can increase its average welfare by 
instituting an optimal buffer-stock scheme. Second, the average welfare 
benefit per unit time in (45) does not depend on a2.  Hence, if  country 118  Alexander H. Sarris 
2 varies its domestic support price, it will not change the benefit that 
can be had by country 1 as in the case of a variable export tax. The 
average benefit that country 1  can reap through buffer stocks, expres- 
sion (49, even though  it pays for them itself, can be shown (Sarris 
1982) under certain conditions to be larger than the average benefits 
that are derived by means of the optimal yearly export tax, expression 
(38). Finally, while W,, in (45) does not depend on a,,  it depends on 
p2,  but the sign of dW,,/dp, is not determinate. 
Interestingly enough, a buffer-stock policy by country 1 could benefit 
country 2. To see this, consider the welfare gain above the no-stock 
situation accruing to country 2 by a buffer stock policy of country 1. 
This is equal to 
(48) 
where p: is the world price that obtains with the stock policy, equation 
(39). 
The expected value of W,, is the following. (The derivation is cum- 
bersome and is omitted.) 
W2t  = y2  (P: -  pf)  [Es,  (P:) + ES2 (ptll, 
- I) 
w  a:  P2f2  [.:"(  * 
20(fI + h') 
+
 2(f, + h'),  0  0(2 - +) 
(49)  W,,  = - 
)I  w(  0  20(2 - $1  + a:-  I+ 
where 0  = x  + y - n, $ = (y - n)/0. 
The term multiplying a:  in (49) is positive, see equation (43), while 
it can be shown that the terms multiplying a:  and a5 inside the bracket 
in (49) are both negative. Hence, for a very low value of P,,  that is, a 
policy of strong internal stabilization as is the case in the EC, a buffer- 
stock policy by the United States could benefit the EC as well. Thus, 
stockholding by the U.S. creates an international free-rider problem. 
A final policy that might be considered by the United States is using 
an export subsidy,  which  raises prices to U.S. producers and con- 
sumers while it decreases international prices by placing a wedge be- 
tween domestic and world  prices. Suppose a  fixed  per-unit  export 
subsidy equal to s is applied by country 1. If pi is the new world price, 
it can readily be shown that it will be equal to 
where pf  is  the world  price  without  the subsidy.  Domestic price  in 
country 1  will be equal top: + s. 
Average producer and consumer welfare in country 1 will increase 
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where p  is the average value of p,  given in (32). However, the cost of 
the subsidy to the government will be very large. The average treasury 
“gain”  is equal to 
(52)  A (GGI) = E [ -  s  ES1, (pi + s)] 
This loss is larger than the gains to  producers and consumers  combined. 
This can be found by adding (51) and (52) and observing that the sum 
is negative. 
An export subsidy  by  country  1  will  hurt country 2  by  lowering 
overall world prices. In fact, if it is assumed that the average internal 
EC price p2  is not changed, only the treasury of country 2 is damaged; 
producers and consumers there are not affected. The average “gain” 
to country 2 of an export subsidy by country 1 can then easily be found 
to be equal to 
where a;  > a2  is the new value of a2  needed to keep p2  constant, and 
p  is given in (32). If a;  = a2,  and -  e2 + f2 p2 < -el + fl  p,  in other 
words, if the EC average net exports are smaller than the average U.S. 
net exports, as is the case between the U.S. and EC grain exports, it 
is clear by comparing (53) and (52) that 
(54)  I A (GGJ 1  < I A (GGi) I) 
in other words, the U.S. treasury loss is larger than the loss inflicted 
on the EC. 
This last point has been supported empirically. Paarlberg and Shar- 
ples (1984) found that a budget cost to the United States of $1.9 billion 
would be required to increase the wheat subsidy costs of the EC by 
$100 million. Similarly, Anderson and Tyers (1983) estimated an annual 
U.S. Treasury cost for wheat of between $800 million and $1  billion 
to increase the annual EC budget by $130-200  million. 
As recent literature on the political economy of  protection has illus- 
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total welfare grounds; the differential political power of  the affected 
groups determines the final outcome. In the U.S. grain trade, there are 
four major affected groups: producers, consumers, the Treasury, and 
the international grain-trading industry. Of the three policies mentioned 
above, the first, export taxes, will hurt producers and the grain traders 
(by decreasing exports), and benefit consumers, and the Treasury. The 
second, buffer  stocks, will  tend to benefit producers  and hurt con- 
sumers, the Treasury, and grain traders, although the average effects 
over the cycle will be small. The main effect of this policy will be a 
tendency toward stabilization of  receipts or expenditures of the main 
groups. Finally, export subsidies will benefit producers and grain trad- 
ers and hurt consumers and the Treasury. The relative magnitudes of 
the gains and losses, of  course, would be different under  the three 
policies. Furthermore, over the market cycle the effects of the policies 
will not be the same. While export taxes and subsidies will  generate 
the same effects on the interest groups under both tight and surplus 
conditions, buffer stocks will tend to generate the opposite effects in 
the two  situations,  The U.S.  reliance  mostly  on buffer  stocks and 
partially on export subsidies (guised as food aid) might be an indication 
of the relatively balanced strengths of the various private interests and 
a weakness of the Treasury. 
4.6  Some Empirical  Estimates for Cereals 
The theory outlined in the previous sections illustrated the potential 
effects of  the US-EC agricultural  trade conflict.  In this section, the 
magnitudes involved are quantified in the case of  wheat  and coarse 
grain trade. No detailed econometric estimates of elasticity parameters 
are derived,  and  the  numbers  should  be  considered  as reasonable 
approximations. 
The basic data in the computations and the results are shown in table 
4.3. While all the quantity and price data have been estimated empir- 
ically by the author, the elasticity figures come from several published 
estimates, including those of the GOL model (Liu and Roningen 1985). 
As simulated, only EC policies are represented, while for the United 
States it is assumed that an approximately free and open market pre- 
vails. This is quite realistic for 1981-1983, as the numbers in table 4.1 
indicate. 
The results show that both the United States and the EC lose sub- 
stantial amounts on average because of the EC grain-support and sta- 
bilization policies. The total average annual U.S. welfare loss for all 
grains is $1,401 million; for the EC, $404 million. The U.S. and the EC 
would gain these amounts if both switched to free trade. It is interesting 
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Table 4.3  Data Parameter Values and Effects of Wheat and Coarse Grain Policies 
(Quantity figures are in thousand metric tons (mt), prices in  US$/mt, GL; 
and GS;  in million US$) 
Wheat  Coarse Grainsb 
Rest  Rest 
of  of 
U.S.  EC  World  U.S.  EC  World 
Average productiona 
Average consumption" 
Average net exportsa 
Short-run supply price 
elasticity 






Value of a; 
Value of pi 
Value of  u; 
Value of  pi 
Long-run gain GL;' 












-  989 
5.5 
57,828  - 
45,953  - 
11,875  -  54,774 
.05  - 
.40  - 
-.I4  -.1e 
-.28  -.3C 
1.3  - 
.28  - 
1,932  3,129 
221 .8  - 
-  309 




















-  .31 




















Sources: FA0 Production und Trude Yearbook (various years), Sarris  (1985), and own estimates 
based on several published studies. GL, and GS, computed. 
"The figures are averages for the 1981-83  years. 
blncludes maize, rye, barley, sorghum, oats, millet and mixed grains. 
'For  the definitions of GL, and GS;,  see equations (22) and (23) in the text. 
dFor  coarse grains, the maize price is taken as the representative price. 
eFor the rest of the world, the elasticities refer to the excess demand. 
products, while the U.S. gains because of the changes in the probability 
distributions, but not enough to overcome the huge losses caused by 
the average price depression. 
If the EC were to switch to free trade, that is, if we set a2  = p2 = 1, 
the model predicts that the average world wheat price would increase 
by 10.8 percent and the average world coarse-grain price would increase 
by  5.3 percent, while the standard deviation of the world wheat price 
would decline by  18 percent and by 3.8 percent for coarse grain. The 
estimates for wheat are close to those of Sarris and Freebairn (1983). 
The gains the United States can obtain by applying an optimal export 
tax in every period, see equation (38), are substantial. For wheat, they 
average $3,116 million, and for coarse grains, $3,335 million annually. 
The reason for this large potential gain is that the U.S.  export tax 
substantially raises the average world price (by an average 56 percent 122  Alexander H. Sarris 
for wheat and 90 percent for coarse grains). Domestic U.S. prices are 
heavily depressed, however, and the large gainer is the U.S. Treasury. 
Notice that the estimated gains are larger than the CAP-inflicted losses. 
But such a policy is politically untenable unless the Treasury proceeds 
are redistributed to farmers, which is unlikely to happen. 
The net gains to the United States from instituting an optimal buffer- 
stock policy, which is wholly financed by the U.S. Treasury, are small 
but  positive.  For wheat, they average $14.6 million a year,  and for 
coarse grains, $5.8 million annually (assuming a value of  y equal to 
.01, which corresponds to $10 per metric ton annual storage cost when 
total excess government stocks are 1 million tons). The maximum gains 
from the buffer stock, that is, when y = 0, are $56.8 million for wheat 
and $142.2 million annually for coarse grains.  The interesting result 
here is that an optimal U.S. government stock policy does not burden 
the Treasury on average and is very beneficial for farmers, since prices 
for their products are substantially stabilized. 
Finally, we can estimate how much the U.S. Treasury would lose 
by  inflicting a budget loss on the EC by  means of export subsidies. 
Using the expressions derived earlier and the results of table 4.3,  it 
can be shown that to inflict a $100 million annual loss on the EC budget 
in the wheat sector, the average U.S. wheat export subsidy would need 
to be $12.30 per metric ton and the average annual U.S. budget cost 
would be $530 million, or about five times as much as the EC’s loss. 
This roughly five-to-one ratio of  U.S. losses to EC losses is close to 
what Anderson and Tyers (1983) also found, using a more complex 
empirical model. 
The recent  weakness of  the U.S.  dollar implies that  a given per- 
centage increase in the EC export subsidy would necessitate an even 
larger U.S. budget outlay. The fact that the United States is currently 
(mid-1986) pursuing this policy, despite the low value of the dollar and 
a budget-conscious government, might be an indication of the enormous 
pressures from producers and the grain industry, strengthened by elec- 
toral politics. 
4.7  Summary and Conclusions 
The Common Agricultural Policy of the EC entails heavy economic 
costs to both the United States and the EC, and it distorts the world 
markets substantially. Since CAP reform is a slow and tedious process, 
given the structure of decision making within the EC, we have explored 
some options by which the U.S. might defend itselffrom the detrimental 
effects of  CAP policies.  While it was  shown both  theoretically and 
empirically that an optimal U.S.  export tax, a measure that exploits 
U.S. monopoly power, would more than compensate the United States 
for the CAP-induced losses, it is probably politically infeasible. A U.S. 123  EC-US Agricultural Trade Confrontation 
export subsidy designed to strain the EC budget would be too costly 
for the  U.S.,  since for every  dollar of  damage inflicted on the EC 
budget, about five U.S. budget dollars would have to be spent. 
The only policy that seems to alleviate the political strains induced 
by the U.S. farmer is a government stockholding policy. By buying for 
storage when world prices are low and selling when world prices are 
high, the U.S.  Treasury is not hurt, the producers benefit when they 
need it most, and the consumers get more  stable prices.  U.S.  grain 
carryover figures from the last two decades show that the United States 
has indeed been manipulating stocks. Whether this has been done in 
an optimal way is a subject for further empirical research. The results 
of this paper suggest that the U.S. ought to consider a more deliberate 
long-term storage policy, rather than be forced to stockpile as a last 
resort by the inevitable swings of the market. 
Finally, it appears that a combination of a small export subsidy and 
a stockholding policy  might  allow the United  States to recoup the 
welfare losses inflicted on it by the EC without hurting U.S. farmers 
in periods of  market downturns. 
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Comment  Dieter Kirschke 
The papers presented by Hayes/Schmitz  and Sarris* are interesting and 
animating. It has been a pleasure  reading them and commenting  on 
Dieter Kirschke has been a country economist at the General-Directorate for Devel- 
opment of the EC Commission and is now professor of agricultural policy at the Technical 
University of Berlin. These comments reflect the author’s personal view and are not an 
official  EC position. 
*Chapters 3 and 4 in this volume. 125  EC-US Agricultural Trade Confrontation 
them. I want to discuss the papers together and put them in the frame- 
work of the current US-EC confrontation in agricultural trade. There 
are basically two problems to be dealt with: (1) Does the EC’s Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) have a negative impact on the United States? 
and (2) Is the present U.S.  reaction justified? 
Evaluation of the CAP 
National agricultural policies are orientated towards domestic prob- 
lems and possible trade effects principally have to be considered as 
mere by-products.  This is widely agreed upon and has clearly  been 
stated in the papers. It is in particular true for the CAP, but the 1985 
Farm Bill seems to indicate that it is also true for the United States. 
The basic feature of the CAP is to support farmers’ income by price 
policy  and, thus, protectionism.  The shortcoming of  such a policy 
approach have been extensively discussed and the main criticism  is 
summarized in the Hayes/Schmitz paper. There is no need to discuss 
these arguments further.  From an economic point of  view, the CAP 
certainly cannot be considered a first- or second-best policy. To put it 
in  other words: the objective function that is maximized by the CAP 
is difficult to imagine, let alone to describe. 
CAP Impact on the United States 
Price Level on World Markets 
There is no doubt that EC agricultural protectionism tends to de- 
crease the price level on several world markets.  HayedSchmitz and 
Sarris give an overview of a multitude of studies that all demonstrate 
this effect, but differ in their empirical estimates. It is obvious that a 
price decrease on world markets is harmful to U.S.  exports such as 
wheat. 
The price level effect is less certain, however, if  dynamic aspects 
are taken into account. In this regard the papers are somewhat con- 
tradictory and confusing. The general question to be answered refers 
to the link of protectionist policies and structural change in agriculture. 
Hayes/Schmitz argue that the CAP tends to shift out the supply curve 
in European agriculture. I can follow their argument that a possible 
risk reduction may increase output; the rough comparison of the yield 
developments in the EC and the United States, however, is not suffi- 
cient to examine the thesis empirically. 
Sarris argues exactly the opposite. According to him high agricultural 
prices would leave marginal farms in production and would thus hamper 
structural change. This sounds reasonable and the argument has in fact 
been discussed extensively in  the German agricultural economics lit- 
erature (Koester 1977). It may indeed be described as a reversed infant U6  Alexander H. Sarris 
industry argument. In any case-a  comprehensive analysis on the link 
between price support policies in agriculture and structural change, 
integrating the arguments presented in the papers, still has to be given. 
Price Instability on World Markets 
The traditional argument has been introduced by Johnson (1975) who 
stated that the CAP would tend to fix  internal prices and thus would 
make world market prices more volatile.  Sarris confirms the recent 
analyses (Schmitz and Koester, 1984) that such a statement only reflects 
part of the problem and may indeed be wrong. The CAP may also help 
to stabilize world market prices, for instance, by stabilizing expecta- 
tions and thus production in European agriculture, and possibly, by 
shifting world production to less risky production areas. The actual 
impact of the CAP on world market price instability therefore can only 
be judged case by case and must be derived by means of comprehensive 
empirical analysis. 
Sarris’s Model 
In this context a brief discussion of Sarris’s model is justified. Sarris 
seems to be restrained in his comments on the “standard partial equi- 
librium trade liberalization exercise” as he calls it-and  then proceeds 
himself in a similar way. The genuine feature of his model, of course, 
is its stochastic formulation. The model underlines the fact that policy 
analysis under uncertainty will seldom yield definite, but rather con- 
ditional results which require a concise discussion of relevant param- 
eters. Politicians will not like this kind of result, though complexity is 
not a shortcoming of the model, but rather of reality. The importance 
of stochastic modeling for policy analysis is therefore emphasized and, 
in particular, the reader’s attention is drawn to some interesting par- 
ticularities of Sarris’s model, notably the simultaneous consideration 
of short- and long-term effects and the modeling of  currency effects 
under uncertainty. 
Some questions concerning Sarris’s model should nevertheless be 
asked. First, both the agricultural policy of the United States and the 
EC have been modeled by introducing a variable price differentiation 
between the domestic and the world market price. The CAP, however, 
can rather be  described as a price-fixing protectionist  policy, and  I 
wonder why Sarris did not model it this way (Kirschke 1985). Second, 
the analysis of, for instance, a U.S.  export tax  is based on a state 
contingent policy concept which could hardly be implemented under 
real world conditions. A preferable way might be to model policies on 
the basis of a quasi-deterministic concept according to which policy 
interventions  are based  on expected  supply  and  demand functions. 
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ments, which is welcome as a precise analytical exercise, but practically 
restricts the analysis to linear functions and additive uncertainty. It is 
therefore  suggested to equally take into account approximation for- 
mulas in stochastic calculus and stochastic simulation. In this context 
I agree with Sarris who says that “not only price levels but also the 
higher moments of  the price distributions should be computed,” but I 
have got to contradict him when he states that “this has not been done 
to any extent yet.”  In fact, several analyses have been done in recent 
years though these have not always been published  in Anglo-Saxon 
journals.  I 
Aggregation of CAP Effects 
Summarizing the discussion it  is difficult to state that the United 
States has actually and undoubtedly suffered from the CAP.  This is 
only obvious if the classical static price level effect is considered. It is 
less obvious if dynamic effects and CAP effects on world market insta- 
bility  are taken  into account. It finally becomes doubtful  if  indirect 
effects are to be included in the analysis, such as an increased EC 
demand for cereal substitutes due to the CAP.  The papers by Hayes/ 
Schmitz and Sarris concentrate on partial market effects and do not 
really deal with such additional effects. This is not a shortcoming of 
the analyses, but simply points to the complexity of the problem to 
which there is no clear-cut answer available. 
U.S. Policy Options 
Let us now stop complicating the discussion and take a simplified 
view of the world.  Consider a single commodity,  say wheat, that is 
exported by the United States and that is protected by the EC’s pro- 
tectionist policy, and suppose that only the classical static price level 
effect of the CAP on the world market is taken into account. Under 
these restrictive conditions the CAP’S negative impact on the U.S. is 
evident. From an economic point of  view, the interest of the United 
States would then be to pursue policies that could help to raise the 
world market price.  What kind of policy options would the U.S., in 
fact, have? 
Inducement of a CAP Change 
The U.S. could obviously plead for a CAP change in order to reduce 
EC surplus production and thus increase the world market price level. 
The selfish way would  be  to enforce EC surplus reduction  by  any 
I. Kirschke (1987) gives an overview of such studies and analizes the CAPS  price- 
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possible CAP change, no matter how EC economic welfare is affected. 
The altruistic way would, however, mean to help the EC to implement 
a first-best CAP from an economic point of view, which could be ben- 
eficial for both sides. The perspective for such a CAP change is widely 
agreed upon and would consist of a separation of  efficiency and dis- 
tribution objectives in European agriculture. This would mean the ab- 
olition of price supports and protectionism and the establishment of 
direct income subsidy schemes. 
The proposal for a CAP change presented by HayedSchmitz goes 
in this direction, but unfortunately not very far. They suggest to support 
farmers’ income by differentiated  production subsidies which, in my 
view, is a combination of a partial price differentiation and a partial 
quota system. It very much resembles the former French approach for 
a CAP reform and might also be considered as a new variation of the 
“small  is beautiful”  concept in agricultural policy formulation. Even 
if the nondebatable argument of political feasibility is admitted I cannot 
see that their proposed system will be easier to implement and admin- 
ister than  some direct income support scheme. Therefore  I  wonder 
why HayesBchmitz did not go some step further towards a first-best 
CAP. 
Adjustment to the CAP 
In a more passive way the United States could also take the CAP 
for granted and adjust its policies accordingly. A first option would 
then be to use market power on the world market and thus increase 
export revenues. Sarris has clearly pointed out that such a policy could 
be realized by an optimal export tax which equates the domestic price 
in the United States to the marginal export revenues. In fact, this is 
the well-known terms-of-trade argument for trade interventions in order 
to increase national  economic welfare.  Sarris has also stated that a 
buffer stock policy could equally help to enhance U.S. economic wel- 
fare even if  it were to be financed by  the U.S.  alone. A final  U.S. 
reaction to the CAP might be the demand for compensation for CAP- 
induced losses. This alternative has not really been discussed by the 
authors. 
The Actual U.S. Behavior 
Increasing Complaints 
The actual U.S. behaviour in the present agricultural trade confron- 
tation does not really reflect the stated options. In the context of  the 
simplified scenario developed here, U.S. complaints about the CAP 
are certainly justified, but they increase at a time when this could not 
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creased for several agricultural  commodities in recent years. This is 
first of all a currency phenomenon due to changes in the dollar’s value, 
but also indicates a change to a more modest price policy in the EC. 
Second, the EC has introduced and discusses the introduction of further 
specific policy measures to cut surplus production such as producer 
coresponsibility levies and quotas for milk production, which may be 
questioned from an EC welfare point of view, but, from a U.S. point 
of view, lead in the right direction. It should, finally, be kept in mind 
that an overall assessment of CAP impacts on the United States cannot 
really be given. Furthermore, the US. itself carries a major respon- 
sibility for the current GATT regulations which have allowed the es- 
tablishment of the CAP as it is. This has clearly been stated by Hayes/ 
Schmitz and Sarris. 
Uneconomic Reactions 
Much of the present  U.S.  complaint is based on the market share 
argument. It is true that EC protectionism tends to reduce U.S. shares 
in  the world markets, but it is also true that there is no monocausal 
relationship between the CAP and export market shares. Following the 
discussions above, in particular, the drop from 53 percent to 43 percent 
in the U.S. share of the world’s grain trade between 1975 and 1984, as 
documented by Hayes/Schmitz, cannot simply be attributed to the CAP, 
but may rather reflect the change in the U.S. monetary policy. Hence, 
thinking in terms of a simple market share does not really consider the 
economics involved. 
Another astonishing feature discussed by Hayes/Schmitz is the re- 
cent U.S. agricultural policy change. The United States seems to be 
willing to repeat the same mistakes the EC has made under the CAP. 
Direct price support schemes, for instance, are strengthened under the 
1985 Farm Bill. The U.S. has introduced an enormous export subsidy 
program  with  the interesting abbreviation  “bicep.”  This is  directly 
opposed to the optimal export tax argument and HayedSchmitz con- 
vincingly argue that this program directly wastes resources and trans- 
fers wealth to cereals-importing countries, many of which are centrally 
planned economies. From a classical economic point of view, indeed, 
the U.S. behaviour cannot be described as anything else but irrational. 
Political Economics in Agricultural Trade 
The U.S. reactions may, however, be rationalized if the purely eco- 
nomic view of the present agricultural trade conflict is broadened and 
some aspects of political economy are taken into account. In view of 
the evident difficulties for a fundamental CAP reform the U .S. behavior 
may simply be explained as a calculated attempt to change the CAP at 
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change in public opinion or increased lobbyist activities. There is no 
need to say that  internal policy restrictions often dominate rational 
policies in a economic sense which may, indeed, be illustrated by the 
CAP itself. Finally, some persons argue that the U.S. reactions should 
most of all be considered as an attempt to turn away from negative 
domestic policy impacts on agriculture. 
Apart from this, a seemingly institutional shortcoming in economic 
policy formation is worth being considered.  According to Harvey’s 
Abilene Paradox people in committees agree on decisions that, as in- 
dividuals, they know are stupid (Dixon 1986). In other words: economic 
decision making or economic negotiations often end with policies that 
cause damage to all parties involved. A possible explanation to this 
phenomenon is given by Fisher and Ury (1981), who describe position 
bargaining as a central shortcoming of negotiations. This is the defence 
of a position once taken by whatever reason which does not reflect 
one’s real interest. This is rather a psychological than an economic 
phenomenon. The current U.S. market-share thinking in the confron- 
tation with the EC may be interpreted as a typical case in point. It is 
a position  that may  not be economically  reasonable, but which has 
been taken and will be defended. Some more examples for unfruitful 
position bargaining in  international economic negotiations and espe- 
cially in the context of  the CAP could easily be identified. In general 
one is tempted to state a “Law of Economic Negotiations” that could 
read as follows: 
If  there are economic negotiations 
there will be a position 
no matter how uneconomic it is. 
The avoidance of an open agricultural trade war between the United 
States and the EC in the summer of  1986 raises some hopes that both 
sides are willing to reduce the conflict and come back to the economics 
involved. The excellent papers presented by Hayes/Schmitz and Sarris 
and the discussion during this conference may further help to strengthen 
economic reasoning in the current US-EC confrontation. 
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